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Abstract 
 
The use of Internet and digitalization has driven nations, enterprises, and citizens to be reliant on 
services provided with information technology. Cyber security exercises provide opportunities for 
organizations to demonstrate critical capabilities and reveal how effectively they integrate people, 
processes, and technology to protect their critical information, services, and assets. Cyber exercises 
also enable organizations to experiment and develop their capabilities. The exercises can help train 
organizations to improve their ability to mitigate impacts to business from cyber threats and at-
tacks. 
 
In this thesis the focus is on defining the requirements of a technical environment for conducting 
various cyber security exercises. The research questions chosen for this master’s thesis were: What 
are the requirements for implementation of different cyber threats? What are the requirements for 
providing a realistic and useful environment for defenders and IT personnel? What are the require-
ments for controlling the exercise? The requirements are divided into six major categories: general 
requirements, global world or “Internet”, defending team requirements, threat actors’ requirement, 
exercise control, and traffic simulation. The selected requirements are gathered from various scien-
tific publications and other references concerning the technical environment. 
 
As a result of the research there is a list of 35 different generalized requirements for implementing 
or constructing technical environment for cyber security exercises. 
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 Tiivistelmä  
 
Digitalisaation ja Internetin käytön yleistymisen kautta ovat valtiot, yritykset ja kansalaiset entistä 
riippuvaisempia palveluista, joita tarjotaan hyödyntäen IT-järjestelmiä. Kyberturvallisuusharjoitukset 
mahdollistavat organisaatioiden testata ja koestaa kyvykkyyttään integroida ihmiset, prosessit ja 
teknologia suojellakseen organisaatiolle kriittisiä tietoja, palveluita ja omaisuutta. Harjoitustoiminta 
myös kehittää ja antaa mahdollisen testata uusia toimintamenetelmiä sekä järjestelmiä. Harjoituk-
set kouluttavat organisaatioita parantamaan kyvykkyyttä suojautua liiketoimintaan kohdistuvia 
riskejä vastaan. 
 
Opinnäytetyö fokusoituu vaatimusmäärittelyyn kyberturvallisuusharjoituksien teknistä ympäristöä 
varten. Valitut tutkimuskysymykset olivat seuraavat: Mitä vaatimuksia aiheutuu eri kyberhyökkäyk-
sien toteuttamisesta ympäristössä? Mitä vaatimuksia on johdettavissa oikeista organisaatioympäris-
töistä sekä puolustusteknologioista? Mitä vaatimuksia aiheutuu kyberturvallisuusharjoituksen hal-
linnasta? Vaatimukset on jaoteltu kuuteen eri kategoriaan: yleiset vaatimukset, globaali maailma tai 
”Internet”, organisaatioympäristöjen vaatimukset, uhkatoimijoiden vaatimukset, harjoituksen hal-
linta, käyttäjä- ja liikennesimulaatio. Valitut vaatimukset on kerätty eri tieteellisistä julkaisuista, 
kirjallisuudesta sekä muista toimialan lähteistä. 
 
Tutkimuksen tuloksena muodostui lista 35:stä eri yleistetystä vaatimuksesta, jotka tulisi ottaa huo-
mioon suunniteltaessa ja rakennettaessa teknistä ympäristöä kyberturvallisuusharjoituksien järjes-
tämiseen. 
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ISP Internet Service Provider 
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 
MitM Man in the Middle 
MSEL Master Scenario Event List 
NTP Network Time Protocol 
RT Red Team 
TLD Top level Domain 
WT White Team  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The use of Internet and digitalization has driven nations, enterprises, and citizens to 
be reliant on services provided with information technology. Production facilities, 
critical infrastructure companies, industry, and other businesses use information 
technology to form a backbone for modern day nations. The digitalization provides 
new opportunities, however, also introduces new risks, which results in the need to 
define the ways to secure these new activities. Cyber security has been used as a 
term to explain the ways to secure non-information based assets that might be vul-
nerable to threats via information and communication technologies; however, cyber 
security is often used interchangeably with the term information technology security 
(Solms & Niekerk 2013, 1).  
Solms and Niekerk (Solms & Niekerk 2013, 4-5) determines the relationships be-
tween information and communication security, information security, and cyber se-
curity. The relationship is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. The relationships between information and communication security, infor-
mation security, and cyber security (Solms & Niekerk 2013, 5) 
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The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) defines cyber security as follows: 
“Cybersecurity is the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, secu-
rity safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, train-
ing, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to pro-
tect the cyber environment and organization and user’s assets. Organi-
zation and user’s assets include connected computing devices, person-
nel, infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunications systems, 
and the totality of transmitted and/or stored information in the cyber 
environment. Cybersecurity strives to ensure the attainment and 
maintenance of the security properties of the organization and user’s 
assets against relevant security risks in the cyber environment.” – (The 
International Telecommunications Union 2015)  
Lately the use of information technology has expanded rapidly to encompass a far 
wider range of services and applications. The threats posed by cyber hacktivists, 
cyber criminals, and other actors require a wider knowledge from IT personnel who 
maintain these services and networks to defend services against those threats.  
Cyber security exercises provide opportunities for organizations to demonstrate criti-
cal capabilities and reveal how effectively they integrate people, processes, and tech-
nology to protect their critical information, services, and assets. Cyber exercises also 
enable organizations to experiment and develop their capabilities. The exercises can 
help train organizations to improve their ability to mitigate impacts to business from 
cyber threats and attacks. Furthermore, exercises provide opportunities for continu-
ous process improvement and the exercise can usually be included easily in the exist-
ing improvement programs. The modern organizations depend on other organiza-
tions as well (subcontractors, service providers, customers, etc.), which creates the 
need to exercise organizations’ capability to handle complex cyber incidents con-
serning several organizations at the same time. 
The exercises usually range from a one-day long exercise to 1 - 2 –week-long exer-
cises. The time range does not include the time used in planning and preparations of 
the exercise. The complexity of the enterprise’s IT environment has created the need 
to conduct larger scale cyber security exercises to train personnel and develop busi-
ness and IT processes to handle different cyber incidents. This creates a need to have 
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a controlled and separate exercise environment which can be utilized to conduct dif-
ferent levels of cyber exercises.  
The goal of this thesis was to create a generalized model of the requirements for 
technical environment of cyber exercises for the independent cyber security re-
search, training, and development center JYVSECTEC. JYVSECTEC is a part of the Insti-
tute of Information Technology in JAMK University of Applied Sciences. The activity 
of JYVSECTEC started in 2011 as a development and investment project funded by 
European Union and private companies. JYVSECTEC aims to be one of the leading 
centers on cyber security in Finland. JYVSECTEC provides services to assist organiza-
tions on issues concerning information and cyber security issues. (JYVSECTEC – 
Jyväskylä Security Technology, 2015a) 
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2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
2.1 Research objectives 
The need for the research is the lack of publicly available requirements for technical 
environment of cyber exercises’. Many of the studies and publications state good 
practices or suggestions on how to conduct the exercise, however, they ignore or 
cover only shortly how to implement or build a cyber exercise environment (also 
called cyber range). The aim of the thesis was to find different requirements from lit-
erature and define a comprehensive set of requirements for a technical environment 
to conduct cyber exercises. 
The objective was to provide requirements from different point of views: 
 What are the requirements for implementation of different cyber threats? 
 What are the requirements for providing a realistic and useful environment 
for defenders and IT personnel? 
 What are the requirements for controlling the exercise? 
Those are the main research questions for this thesis, however, also other require-
ments are gathered together to give as comprehensive a list of requirements as pos-
sible. 
2.2 Research methods 
The selected method for the thesis is inductive research approach which was chosen 
because of the nature of the research questions and the goal to specify an extensive 
list of requirements for building a technical environment for information and cyber 
security exercises. 
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Inductive research approach enables to build a theory based on earlier researches 
and publications on the topic (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009, 125-126). Also, the 
data used in the research is qualitative data.  
The inductive approach is considered to begin with detailed observations of the 
world in order to move towards more abstract generalisations and ideas. In other 
words, when following inductive approach, a researcher applies to develop empirical 
generalisations and identify initial relationships as he advances through the research. 
(Burney, 2008) 
One of the reasons for choosing the inductive research approach was also the lack of 
scientific studies of the requirements for technical environment of cyber security ex-
ercises. The idea of this thesis was to compile comprehensive a set of requirements 
that are not restricted to one type of exercise or other activity. The requirements 
were gathered from different studies, guides, and journals conducted on cyber secu-
rity exercises which will outline the basis of the research data. However, also studies 
and publications on real attacks, defence methods and other supporting data were 
used as a source for this thesis.  
The combination of the various sources enables the research to fulfill the needs to 
build a set of requirements for a realistic and versatile technical environment for 
cyber security exercises. The requirements are gathered in section 4 and the com-
plete list of requirements is presented in Appendix I. 
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3 CYBER SECURITY EXERCISES 
3.1 Overview of cyber security exercises 
Cyber security, incident, and domain are vital terms to understand when considering 
conducting cyber security exercises. Cyber security and cyber domain consist of 
multi-layered worldwide interconnected networks involving IT networks which are 
operated by government organizations, public authorities and the business commu-
nity. The quickly growing global cyber domain brings nations, businesses, and citizens 
even closer together. Although this development has brought wealth and growth, it 
has also increased the risks. Cyber attacks can interrupt or even bring down the parts 
of critical infrastructure and society’s vital functions. (Secretariat of the Security 
Committee 2013, 17-19) 
To understand elements of cyber security exercises, it is vital to know some key defi-
nitions: 
 Cyber domain or Cyberspace is a global domain within the information envi-
ronment consisting of the interdependent network of information systems in-
frastructures including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer 
systems, and other IT networks 
 Cyber attack is an attack, via cyberspace, targeting an enterprise’s use of cy-
berspace for the purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying, or maliciously 
controlling a computing environment/infrastructure; or destroying the integ-
rity of the data; or stealing controlled information 
 Cyber incident is an action taken through the use of computer networks that 
results in an actual or potentially adverse effect on an information system8 
and/or the information residing therein 
 Master Scenario Event List (MSEL) is a collection of pre-written events in-
tented to guide an exercise towards planned outcomes 
 Event/Inject is an activity executed as a part of master scenario event list 
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 Blue Team is a group of exercise participants that controls a particular organi-
zation environment 
 Red Team is a group of participants that executes cyber attacks and acts as a 
different threat actors 
 White Team is a group that controls and manages the cyber security exercise 
 Green Team is a group that has administrative control of the technical envi-
ronment used to provide cyber security exercises. Green team is often re-
sponsible for building necessary changes to exercise environments based on 
the exercise’s scenario 
The term cyber in this thesis refers to the people, operations, processes, and technol-
ogy associated with digital information systems, networks, and the data that 
traverses them.  
Information and cyber security work is an ongoing process within each organization. 
Private and public organizations are responsible for maintaining their information in-
frastructure and protecting its functions even during critical cyber attacks and IT inci-
dents. They are also in charge of ensuring the normal operations of the IT systems 
and infrastructure under normal circumstances using their incident management, 
change management, and other processes. (Wilhelmson & Svensson 2013, 1-7) 
Even when critical incidents increase pressure on an organization, information and 
cyber security need to be maintained so that IT and communication systems can op-
erate or can be recovered quickly in the event of an interruption. During the normal 
operations as well as under the cyber attacks data and information will still need to 
be accessible and able to be transferred without compromising confidentiality, integ-
rity and availability which means that the data and information need to be safe from 
unauthorized accesses or alterations without risking the access from normal users. 
(Wilhelmson & Svensson 2013, 1-7) 
Cyber security domain operations are critical to the success and credibility of any or-
ganization. However, many organizations seldom evaluate and exercise their cyber 
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security capabilities and business processes to validate if those processes will be suf-
ficient against cyber threats, incidents, or attacks. Organizations can execute many 
different scenarios during an exercise. The focus should be on assessing effects on 
critical systems and data which will have an impact on the operation or services. 
(Kick 2014, 1-4)  
Conducting cyber security exercises can improve information and cyber security 
when combined with the skills to communicate problems and solutions in collabora-
tion with others. The improvements can help an organization to improve normal op-
erating processes and skills as well as train an organization to handle difficult circum-
stances that require decision-making under time pressure when significant values are 
at stake (such as material wealth and human life). Information and cyber security ex-
ercises complement regular preparedness and crisis management exercises and 
therefore are of great importance for organizations. (Wilhelmson & Svensson 2013, 
1-7) 
“Exercises to reduce threats, risks, vulnerabilities and consequences and 
protect critical information infrastructures in contemporary information 
and cyber security environment are vital in establishing a resilient soci-
ety.” – (Wilhelmson & Svensson 2013, Foreword) 
Conklin and White (Conklin & White 2006, 1) dictates in their paper that the cyber 
community is beginning to approve exercises as crucial tools for developing pro-
cesses and skills to strengthen organizations against cyber threats.  
Cyber security exercises allow organizations to demonstrate critical capabilities, thus 
exposing how efficiently they integrate their staff, processes, and technology to de-
fend their information assets and cyber-reliant services. Cyber security exercises also 
enable organizations to experiment with new ideas and proposed capabilities. Exer-
cises can help educate organizations to strengthen their ability to mitigate impacts to 
business and national security objectives resulting from targeted cyber attacks. They 
can enhance existing efforts within an organization to protect their critical assets. 
When exercises include a hands-on component, they can take an organization into 
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demonstrating their ability to protect, detect, and respond to various threats. 
(JYVSECTEC – Jyväskylä Security Technology 2015b) 
Corporations and other organizations are reliant on ICT systems and networks. The 
digitalization is bringing more challenges for organizations to maintain and adminis-
ter all the ICT systems and network by themselves. Therefore many organizations 
have outsourced many parts of the ICT to different service providers. Because organi-
zations are dependent on other organizations it is important to train communication, 
decision making, and situational awareness of cyber incidents together. Cyber secu-
rity exercises can be a tool for improving processes between different organizations 
and finding targets for development. In cyber security domain it is often difficult to 
know what service providers are allowed to do to prevent cyber attacks. (JYVSECTEC 
– Jyväskylä Security Technology 2015b) 
Cyber security exercise is a powerful tool for enhancing an organization’s readiness 
and resilience against modern cyber threats. The aim of the exercises is to identify 
targets for development of a cyber security incident’s effects and consequences. The 
objective of cyber security exercises is to improve the participating organizations’ 
abilities to detect vulnerabilities in their systems, services, and processes. The events 
of the exercise mainly emulate the actions of the planned threat actors against an or-
ganization’s critical assets and data, however, also the impacts of the actions. A cyber 
security incident might have physical effects or the effects are limited to cyber do-
main. The objectives of the exercise define the scope and the form for the exercise. 
Exercises commonly focus on the actions before the cyber incident and the actions 
after the breach or incident is detected. The contents of the exercise can be roughly 
divided into the following (JYVSECTEC – Jyväskylä Security Technology 2015b): 
1. Recognition, evaluation, briefing 
 Risk assessments 
 Procedures, responsibilities and roles 
 Identifying and categorizing critical assets 
2. Protection 
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 Access control 
 Safeguarding data at use, rest, and in motion 
 Configuration management, change management, incident manage-
ment 
 Vulnerability management  
3. Detection 
 Incident and anomaly monitoring, detection, and evaluation 
4. Countermeasures 
 Communication 
 Incident analysis 
 Isolation of incident and impact minimizing 
5. Recovery 
 Testing the recovery plan in action 
3.2 Structure of cyber exercise 
Cyber security exercises involve a number of actors that plan, participate in, and 
manage the exercise. Therefore, exercises are often planned and carried out as pro-
jects (Wilhelmson & Svensson 2013, 9). European Network and Information Security 
Agency (2009, 16) divides exercises in their “Good practice guide for national exer-
cises” into four parts: identifying, planning, conducting, and evaluating. As seen in 
Figure 2, the different states of the exercise can include many responsibilities for dif-
ferent actors/participants. 
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Figure 2. Lifecycle of an exercise (European Network and Security Agency 2009, 16) 
The time frame for the lifecycle can vary from 1-2 months to 9-12 months. The differ-
ent phases of the lifecycle depend on the objectives and forms of the exercise. 
In the identifying and planning phase it is important to determine the purpose, limi-
tations, and scope for the exercise. The planning process should be clearly formu-
lated and have a timetable. However, before starting the actual planning of the exer-
cise, the needs and reasons for having the exercise must be clearly formulated. The 
analysis should answer at least the following questions: (Wilhelmson & Svensson 
2013, 15, 29) 
 What should the exercise achieve? Overall purpose of the exercise 
 Who should participate in exercise? The target group for the exercise with 
consideration for what the purpose and objectives of their participation are 
 What should be exercised? Selecting the approach and content of the exer-
cise 
 When should the participants exercise? 
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 How should the participants exercise? Selecting the format and the practical 
approach for carrying out the exercise 
 Where should the exercise be held? 
 What resources are needed? 
Defining clear and well scoped objectives for the exercise helps planning, conducting, 
and evaluating the process and results. 
“Without clear objectives, planners cannot design a meaningful exer-
cise. The objectives enable planners to clearly structure the scenarios 
within the exercise to determine if their organization possesses the ca-
pabilities necessary to operate successfully within a hostile cyber envi-
ronment and defend against cyber threats. Different organizations have 
different guiding principles, tools, tactics, and procedures, which make it 
important to establish a baseline for each exercise.” – (King 2014, 4) 
 
In the planning phase when the objectives and scope of the exercise are determined, 
the exercise specific needs for the technical environment also need to be specified. 
Often a specific scenario can require implemention of new features into the environ-
ment. The technical environment should be provided as a base setup with different 
network topologies, operating systems, application software, configurations, and 
user accounts (Sommerstad & Hallberg 2012, 3). How these elements are composed 
and implemented together with the base setup, will depend on the scenario and the 
purpose of the exercise.  
The selected form of the exercise is based mainly on the defined objectives. Different 
forms of exercises can be roughly divided into three parts: Table top, functional, and 
hybrid/full live exercise. In the different exercises the participants are grouped usu-
ally as Blue Teams, Red Team(s), White Team, and Green Team members. Each of the 
teams might not be applicable in each type of exercise and grouping depends on the 
chosen scenarios and ways to conduct the exercise. 
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Table top exercise 
 
Table top exercises have usually a small training audience and amount of participants 
which makes it easier to experiment cyber security exercises in organizations. A table 
top exercise should have well-defined objectives. The events and injects are pre-co-
ordinated, often hypothetical, and written down. This type of approach to exercise 
helps organizations to train communications, processes, and decision making. Many 
organizations use table top exercises to establish relationships and share information 
with other organizations and partners. The aim of the table top exercises is to test 
the readiness of response capabilities and raise awareness. (King 2014, 9) 
Functional exercise  
 
Functional exercises enable organization’s personnel responsible for operations and 
processes to verify their IT plans, processes, and their operational preparedness 
against modern threats and emergencies by performing their duties in a simulated 
operational environment. These type of exercises are often scenario-driven and in-
clude ready-made situations that are simulated during the exercise. (Grance, Nolan, 
Burke, Dudley, White & Good 2006, 5-1) 
Functional exercises can also be called simulation or controlled environment exer-
cises. These sorts of exercises are usually conducted in constructed and partly fic-
tional environments where the infrastructure is built separately from the organiza-
tion’s production IT systems. (Wilhelmson & Svensson 2013, 33) 
These types of simulated exercises are designed to exercise participants, procedures, 
and assets involved in one or more functional aspects of an IT plan. The participants 
should respond to the events which are conducted based on the scenario and act ac-
cordingly. Each event and situation needs to be carried out as if it were a real event. 
In these cases also the counterplay for participants’ responses is needed. The coun-
terplay acts as the outside world of the exercise, acting as in the role of various peo-
ple and organizations with whom/which the participants may need to come in con-
tact. Conducting these kinds of events and actions, the exercise plan needs to be pro-
duced carefully. The plan should include at least instructions to the participants, time 
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tables, event lists, and materials. A functional exercise provides high educational 
value for the participants and for those who are counterplaying. The exercises can 
have different complexity levels and scopes, from validating strictly specified aspects 
of organizations processes or assets to full-scale exercises that address all parts of 
the organization’s functions. Therefore, the duration of the exercise can be from be-
tween several hours to several days. (Grance et al. 2006, 5-1; Wilhelmson & Svens-
son 2013, 33-34) 
Hybrid/Full live exercise 
Hybrid and full live exercises are based on real events to increase the realism. Hybrid 
exercises include elements from technical exercises and functional exercises that are 
brought together to make realistic events against pre-determined targets (i.e. assets, 
people, and data). These events are set by the exercise planning group and are usu-
ally defined in an events list. Full live exercises include an active adversary team 
which is called Red Team (RT). Red Team tries to discover vulnerabilities and weak-
nesses in systems, processes, and communication plans that would contribute to the 
training to the participants. Red Team counterplays the technical events against the 
participant technical staff with the guidance of the exercise’s control team (usually 
labelled as White Team, WT). (King 2014, 10-11) 
Today organizations depend on other organizations to operate and provide services 
for internal and external partners. Therefore, a full live exercise should include multi-
ple organizations and interdependencies between the organizations. The exercise re-
quires realworld events that would appear in real life. These sort of exercises are of-
ten difficult or risky to conduct in live environments which creates the need for a 
controlled and realistic environment for stimulating current business processes of 
the participating organizations. The realism of exercise event, injects, and partici-
pants’ responses determines the success of the cyber security exercise. Planning the 
live cyber security exercise, planners must understand the types of threats the train-
ing audience would face in a day-to-day situation and then develop injects that will 
utilize those methods during the exercise. (King 2014, 10-11) 
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3.3 Technical environment  
The technical environment of the cyber security exercises, often also called cyber 
range, is a controlled environment with systems, networks, services, and users gen-
erally isolated from live production networks. Such an environment can be physical 
or virtual; however, often it is a combination of the two. The hybrid model of using 
physical and virtual infrastructure allows a cost-effective and versatile platform for 
conducting different exercise scenarios. The exercise environment provides access to 
participants from any organizations withour depending on the participants’ ability to 
provide their own equipment. (King 2014, 11-12) 
The technical environment for cyber security exercises can be quite extensive de-
pending on the purpose of the exercise and the selected method (exercise form and 
type). For small-scale and table top exercises it may be sufficient to provide infra-
structure to control the exercise and deliver different events and injects to partici-
pants. In larger scale exercises such as the hybrid or full live simulation, the exercises 
require networks of interconnected systems and services to provide realistic and 
meaningful environment for selected exercise scenario. (Wilhelmson & Svensson 
2013, 71) 
The technical environment can provide excellent means to demonstrate different 
cyber security events and threats of an ICT environment to the training participants. 
The environment should be able to demonstrate desirable and undesirable features 
towards replicated and implemented critical services and assets. Such an environ-
ment should be easily reset and reconfigured to allow to replay opportunities and re-
peats of the events. Red Team (the adversaries or cyber attackers) should also have 
abilities to use their capabilities without disruption of real-world networks and sys-
tems. The exercise environment should enable different scenarios to train “what if” 
questions, discover vulnerabilities in systems or processes, or confirm that the exist-
ing architecture and procedures are adequate and should be further executed in the 
organization. (King 2014, 11-12) 
19 
 
 
Sometimes the exercise’s technical environment may have unrealistic and artificial 
settings to which the participants would normally have access or would normally use. 
These sort of setbacks should be instructed to the training audience thoroughly. 
(King 2014, 11-12) 
The exercise environment has to be as realistic as possible so the participants can 
adapt to it easily and do not fight against the exercise. A realistic environment can re-
quire a significant amount of labour, hardware, software, and expertise, therefore 
the realism is sometimes traded against costs. The exercise environment does not 
need to be one-to-one copy of the real life, but rather a scaled-down and controlled 
environment which has equivalences to real life. Also real life environments are built 
to be as resilient as possible and have as few as possible exposed vulnerabilities. The 
exercise environment should enable a possibility to conduct different attacks against 
planned and implemented known vulnerabilities. (Sommestad & Hallberg 2012, 3-4) 
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4 REQUIREMENTS FOR TECHNICAL ENVIRONMENT 
4.1 Overview of requirements 
The requirements for technical environment are divided into six major categories: 
general requirements, global world or the “Internet”, defending team requirements, 
threat actors’ requirements, exercise control, and traffic simulation: however, there 
are requirements that are initiated from other categories and references to another 
category.  
The purpose is to define generalized model of requirements for the technical envi-
ronment. The requirements are gathered from scientific publications and literature 
which cover cyber security exercises. Also other references are used to derive the re-
quirements from normal operations or cyber attacks.  
4.2 General requirements 
Requirement 1.1: Technical environment should be isolated and controlled 
The technical environment of cyber exercises should be isolated from production 
networks and the Internet to prevent misguided attacks outside of the exercise envi-
ronment. The separation can be done in various ways, one should consider imple-
menting at least IP level isolation to the environment. The technical environment 
should be isolated because in many countries running malicious code in live produc-
tion networks is forbidden, therefore it is important to take care of the isolation of 
the environment.  For example, in Finnish criminal code there is a law against a per-
son who, in order to impede or cause harm to data processing or the functioning or 
security of data system or telecommunications has malicious or harmful software or 
devices in their possession or tries to interference with communications (Finlex, 
2015b, Chapter 34 sections 9a and 9b). The Finnish Government has stated in their 
proposal HE 153/2006 (Finlex, 2015b) that the possession of a data system offence 
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device for the academic or scientific use is excluded. Finnish criminal code acts as an 
example of the precautions on the isolation that needs to be considered when using 
real attacks and attacking tools.  
Requirement 1.2: Remote usage of the environment should be available 
Nowadays the training should not be locked in a specific location. The users demand 
that they can access the training environment anywhere at any time. The environ-
ment’s usage should be made as user-friendly as possible because some of the users 
in the exercises are other than IT personnel who might not have the technical skills to 
configure their systems for access.  
Requirement 1.3: Airlock implementation for using certain real life services from 
the Internet 
Many IT security devices and software are dependent on their access to a manufac-
turer’s public services via Internet. Also, the need for updating threat knowledge and 
signature databases is easier with automated functionalities of the systems. How-
ever, one should consider also limiting the update levels of IT security devices and 
software on the same levels that the operating systems and applications are (see re-
quirement 2.6). The need for this kind of limitation is often defined in the exercise’s 
scenario or objectives. 
Requirement 1.4: Airlock implementation for transferring files to isolated exercise 
environment 
Exercise participants usually like to bring their own tools and files to the environment 
as a part of the exercise. This kind of controlled method to deliver these files should 
be implemented to the technical environment. Airlock implementation of files’ trans-
fer should be at minimum done at other than network layers to prevent any leakage 
of data outside of the environment. 
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Requirement 1.5: Use of virtualization and container virtualization to improve effi-
ciency 
Virtualization is a key technology to improve and enchance the computing in modern 
servers. The network functionality virtualization also brings more opportunities to 
implement different networking and security systems as virtual machines. The use of 
virtualization and NFVs gives administration of the technical environment possibili-
ties to create even more complex and realistic IT environments for the exercises. The 
container virtualization can also help creating small virtualized systems with small re-
source needs by lowering overhead of virtual machines in hypervisors. Container vir-
tualization is an approach to virtualization in which the virtualization layer runs as an 
application within the operating systems that can be virtualized in hypervisor level. 
The use of virtualization and virtualized network devices does not exclude the need 
for the use of also physical devices interconnected to the virtualized resources. The 
technical environment should enable to connect physical devices to the technical re-
sources. 
Requirement 1.6: Network traffic capture should be possible from different parts of 
the technical environment 
Koufil et al. (2014) have defined in Cloud-based testbed for simulation of cyber at-
tacks study the need for network monitoring infrastructure which could be a set of 
probes, a data processing unit and a database. This sort of approach is enough for 
the analysis of the attacks, it is a single purpose solution. The technical environment 
of cyber security exercises’ should also enable the possibility to capture network traf-
fic in different parts of the technical environment for data analysis, and defending 
team’s monitoring and detection purposes. 
Requirement 1.7: The technical environment should have a modular structure 
Modularity will give opportunity to develop different parts of the technical environ-
ment independently of others. The modular approach enable administration to bring 
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new features and functionalities as a part of the environment faster and more cost-
effectively. The modularity is also a necessity to match the rapid development of the 
Internet and digitalization. The modular structure also enables the use of templates 
as a basis for building different exercise scenarios and exercise environments. 
The selection of the scale of the modules can be done on many levels. The decision 
on the scale should be made by the technical environment’s administration based on 
the extent of the environment and available resources on maintaining and further 
developing the environment. In the simplest manner the modules can be divided into 
“Internet”, defending team environments, and threat actors’ systems: however, of-
ten it is more reasonable to be more specific on dividing the environment. For exam-
ple, the Internet can be divided into ISPs’ routing core, global web services, and func-
tionality services (e.g. DNS). One should also consider using modules on other parts 
of the environment to ease the development and implementations as a part the 
completeness of the environment. 
4.3 Global world or the “Internet” 
Global world or the “Internet” is needed for bringing realism as a key part of the en-
vironment. The realism is a vital part of cyber security exercises for participants to 
adapt the exercise’s scenario and fully utilize their normal activities. The “Internet” 
also enables social and news media to be a part of the scenario. Nowadays, many 
cyber threats can harm organizations’ public image and therefore it is necessary to 
also train participants to handle the media pressure or to provide necessary infor-
mation for media representatives during the cyber attacks. 
Many of the current attack vectors also use global Internet infrastructure to utilize 
the attacks or hide the sources of the attacks. More information on the requirements 
or references of cyber attacks is presented in chapter 4.5. 
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Requirement 2.1: Global ISP infrastructure for providing backbone of the “Inter-
net”. 
The requirement includes a realistic set of different Internet Service Provider (ISP) 
networks and their real Autonomous System (AS) numbers as well as public IPv4 and 
IPv6 addresses. The backbone of the Internet should also have different transfer me-
dia and technologies which can be real systems or emulated ones. ISP infrastructure 
should have BGP routing implemented between different ISPs as realistically as possi-
ble. The BGP should be implemented with the use of RFC compliant BGP routers; 
thus any BGP related incidents can be trained during cyber security exercises. The in-
terconnectivity between ISPs should be implemented in a manner which enables, for 
example BGP Man in the Middle attacks, covered in detail in section 4.5.2, and Cloud 
DDoS mitigation techniques which uses BGP as a method for traffic diversion. 
Requirement 2.2: Global DNS and NTP infrastructure 
The global “Internet” of the technical environment should include DNS infrastructure 
which has the same structures as the Internet’s DNS infrastructure. DNS infrastruc-
ture should be implemented in the same hierarchical way as the real world counter-
part. The hierarchy should include several root DNS servers, a comprehensive set of 
top level DNS (TLD) servers, and organization level authoritative DNS servers. The 
DNS servers should be located in a different parts of the technical environment’s ISPs 
to represent the realistic distribution. DNS infrastructure should also include imple-
mented DNSSEC features at least on root DNS server and on a set of TLD servers.  
Time is an important factor when considering IT systems and their interoperation 
functions. The exercise environment should have a defined timing source, for exam-
ple NTP which is made globally available inside the exercise environment. To ease 
the implementation of global timing source, NTP infrastructure should have the same 
functionalities as the real global NTP infrastructure has. 
 
25 
 
 
Requirement 2.3: Global certificate and/or PKI infrastructure 
The certificates and public certificate infrastructure are the basis for the chain of 
trust in public networks and services. The certificates and encryption provide confi-
dentiality, integrity, and authentication information of the service for the users. The 
technical environment should have a defined trusted root certificate authority which 
can delegate certificates to other certificate authorities. Once the global certificate 
authority chains have been implemented, the services using certificates as a part the 
encryption should have certificates signed by a global certificate authority infrastruc-
ture. This creates a realistic chain of trust for publicly available services that use cer-
tificates as a part the encryption process. The root certifications should be available 
in the technical environment and they should be deployed to the endpoints so end 
users would automatically see trusted services as trusted based on the issued certifi-
cates. 
Requirement 2.4: Comprehensive set of public web services 
The technical environment should have a comprehensive set of public web services 
that include at minimum social media, news sites, end user services, forums, and 
other services. The set of public web services should also include web sites which can 
be used as a part of cyber attacks or other activities by cyber criminals (e.g. under-
ground forums, Pastebin like web site, and TOR web sites) 
Requirement 2.5: Cloud services as part of global “Internet” 
Cloud services can be understood as cloud computing services (i.e. which provides 
computing services from their data centers.) and cloud web services (i.e. which can 
include file storages, email services, social media services, instant messaging services, 
and collaboration services). The cloud services have global significance and provide a 
set of vital services for modern organizations. 
From a technical point of view, cloud services are globally significant and should have 
data center locations in different parts of the global “Internet”. The end users should 
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be directed to different data centers of cloud services based on their geolocation 
that is on other hand defined based on user’s IP address. 
Requirement 2.6: Operating systems’ and application update repositories 
The technical environment should have controlled update repositories for operating 
systems and application software. The ability to control the patch levels of operating 
systems and applications enables to conduct so called zero day attacks without own-
ing knowledge about actual unpatched vulnerabilities. The update repositories can 
also be used to simulate critical patch availability and therefore exercise participants 
are able to exercise patch management on those situations. 
Requirement 2.7: Social media sites and functionalities should be implemented as 
part of the technical environment 
Social media is a key part of the Internet nowadays. Organizations use social media 
as a platform to release announcements and communicate to their customers. Social 
media is also a major part of spreading the news more quickly than traditional news 
media sites. 
Hacktivists and other criminal organizations also use social media as a part of their 
operations and ways to make their causes more public. Anonymous is one of the best 
known hacktivist groups that are really active using social media (e.g. Twitter) to 
spread the threats against their targets. 
Social media also enhance the real life like feeling of the exercises and brings the 
commonly used tools available for the participants.  
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Requirement 2.8: A set of news media sites should be implemented as part of the 
technical environment 
News media are commonly used to create more real life pressure for the exercise’s 
participants. News media sites should be used as publication platforms for announc-
ing news about different events occurring during the exercise. The set of different 
news media sites should include real life like sites around the world to enable various 
scenarios for exercises. The media sites are also targets for organization’s end-users 
who browse the public web services from their workstations.  
4.4 Defending team requirements (Blue Teams) 
Blue Team environments are either fictional enterprise environments or realistic cop-
ies of real enterprise environments. Blue team environment can be one or multiple 
sites that can include office environments, data centers, research environments, 
and/or production facilities (e.g. factories). Blue team environments usually include 
various systems for administrators and IT management as well as several business 
critical systems and services. The role of the end users of the organizations can not 
be forgotten because they can provide impulses or incidents that may or may not be 
part of a cyber incident. 
Branlat, Morison and Woods (Branlat et al, 2011) have defined two interrelated goals 
for cyber defence. Blue teams need to maintain production while preventing attack-
ers from gaining access, and from acting on the network (e.g. stealing or distrupting 
data, interfering the production processes). Participants of the blue team need to 
prevent illegitimate activities by mitigating potential vulnerabilities or attack surface 
and recovering from breaches when discovered. This definition of responsibilities of 
blue team creates the needs to have functional tools for monitoring and operating 
the IT infrastructure (covered in Requirement 3.6).  
Branlat et al. (2011) have created blue team processes for interplaying against Red 
Team. The Blue Team process is presented in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Blue Team interplay process (Branlat et al, 2011) 
The Branlat et al. (2011) view of the necessary Blue Team processes lacks infor-
mation about communication of a detected incident to the end users and 3rd parties 
(e.g. service providers, subcontractors, cooperation partners etc.). Hence the pro-
cesses and tools for communicating to organization’s employees and business part-
ners need to be implemented as a crucial part of the exercise’s technical environ-
ment so participants can be trained to handle the incidents as well as the communi-
cations (covered in requirement 3.5). 
Patriciu and Furtuna (Partriciu & Furtuna, 2009) have defined a defence oriented ap-
proach for cyber exercises. Their approach is to study and practice the defence meth-
ods that can be used during cyber attacks. Patriciu and Furtuna (2009) have divided 
the cyber defence into the following actions: 
 Create a security policy 
 Implement the security state 
 Monitor the security state 
 Test your own security state 
 Improve the security 
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The actions concerning operations of the Blue Teams create the requirements for dif-
ferent detection, monitoring, handling, and recovering the cyber incidents and at-
tacks. These requirements for the operations of Blue Team are defined under re-
quirement 3.6. 
Patriciu and Furtuna (2009) also dictates that there are at least three ways to organ-
ize the exercise: 
1. The participants receive the requirements and services they should provide 
and they must develop their own computer systems to provide them 
2. The participants receive default installations for specific systems and services 
to provide and they must configure them in order to be protected 
3. The participants receive already installed and configured systems and they 
must protect them. In this approach, the attacker can be the instructor or an 
external party 
The first statement states that participants need to have a capability to build their 
own infrastructure as a part of the exercise’s technical environment. This is stated in 
requirement 3.1. 
Requirement 3.1: Participants should be able to build their own systems and ser-
vices 
The second statement of Patriciu and Furtuna (2009) can be considered as a ready-
made blue team environment which would include different elements defined in re-
quirements 3.3 to 3.7.  
The third statement of Patriciu and Furtuna (2009) defines the need for ready-made 
blue team technical environments which can be put in to operation quickly and eas-
ily. These sorts of environments can be constructed as templates using e.g. virtualiza-
tion templates of prepared systems and services.  
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Requirement 3.2: Providing ready-made blue team systems and services as tem-
plates 
Patriciu and Furtuna (2009) have stated for potential targets of attacks as:  
 Computer networks 
 Public services 
 Humans 
 Trust relationships 
The computer network targets need to be a part of the Blue Team environment 
which can include their internal services (either IT infrastructure services or IT ser-
vices organization’s employees), publicly available services (e.g. web services), and 
communication systems (either for internal or external communication). These tar-
gets generate the basis for the requirements 2.7, 2.8, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.8. 
Requirement 3.3: Internal infrastructure services 
Blue Team’s internal infrastructure represents core services which provide central 
user directory (e.g. Active Directory or LDAP), DNS services, NTP services, File ser-
vices, internal web services and other internal services. These services are usually ac-
cessible only for organization’s (Blue Team) users or staff. 
Blue team internal services can be located in one network segment or they can be di-
vided into several segments based on the objectives and scenario of the exercise. 
Requirement 3.4: Public services provided by Blue Team 
The Blue team environment should also include publicly available services which rep-
resent an organizations core public services. These services could include: 
- Authoritative DNS servers and other DNS servers 
- Email servers for transferring email  
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- Web based access to personnel’s emails 
- Publicly available web sites 
- Mockup services to mimic real life services (e.g. e-commerce, online banking) 
These kinds of services can be provided via data center segments of the Blue team’s 
environment or by external service provider. 
Requirement 3.5: Internal and external communication services 
The users should have during exercises similar tools to use in communication that 
they use in real life. Their communication to organization’s internal and external 
members should be created using services which are implemented either as a part of 
the organization’s exercise environment or as a cloud service. These services should 
include at least the following: Email services, Voice over IP (VoIP), and instant mes-
saging (for example cloud-based instant messaging, XMPP based chat or Microsoft 
Lync). 
Requirement 3.6: Technical management tools for preventing, detecting, handling, 
and recovering from cyber incidents 
These tools should include at least: Firewalls, central log server with log analysis 
tools, IDS/IPS systems, network and servers monitoring, incident handling and/or 
ticketing system, backups, Security incident events management (SIEM) systems, and 
network analysis tools. These are the tools that the Blue team’s technical personnel 
(systems administrators, security staff, and network operators) use to manage the 
blue team’s environment. The specific tools depend on the exercise’s scenario, ob-
jectives, and participating personnel. 
Silva et al. (2014) have found that the most successful participants of the exercises 
were the ones that combined their own specialized tools to commonly available and 
implemented tools, which generates requirement 3.7. 
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Requirement 3.7: Participants should be able to implement and integrate their own 
tools as part of the exercise environment 
Users should be able to bring their own physical devices and implement virtualized 
systems as a part of the blue team’s environment. The participants should also have 
an administrative access on blue team’s systems to deploy their own tools as a part 
of the system. These sort of possibilities should be documented and instructed to 
participants. 
Requirement 3.8: Services that simulate or mimic real life critical services for enter-
prises 
The services that are business critical systems for enterprises need to be imple-
mented either as a mockup or as an operational copy of the real service depending 
on the objectives of the exercise. The mockup services should be reusable templates 
which can be implemented easily into different enterprise environments.  
4.5 Threat actors’ requirements (Red Team) 
4.5.1 Overview of Red teaming and adversaries in exercises 
The Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom (UK Ministry of Defence, 2013, 1-1) 
defines Red teaming process as a tool to reduce enterprises’ risks. The expression 
“Red Team” among the military is often used to describe a way to think differently 
and to be able to anticipate and model adversarial behaviour (Brangetto, Caliskan & 
Roigas 2015, 6). UK Ministry of Defence (UK Ministry of Defence, 2013, 1-2) defines 
the broader concept of red teaming: 
“A red team is a team that is formed with the objective of subjecting an 
organisation’s plans, programmes, ideas and assumptions to rigorous 
analysis and challenge. Red teaming is the work performed by the red 
team in identifying and assessing, inter alia, assumptions, alternative 
options, vulnerabilities, limitations and risks for that organisation. Red 
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teaming is a tool set. Using it will provide the end user (commander, 
leader, or manager) with a more robust baseline for decision making.” - 
(UK Ministry of Defence, 2013, 1-2) 
Red Teams mimic the mind-set, actions, and operations of the attackers and adver-
saries to test an organization’s cyber security capabilities. They use the tools that are 
commonly used in penetration testing and information security testing. (Brangetto et 
al. 2015, 4) 
The use of Red team depends on the scope and needs. Red teams can be used to (UK 
Ministry of Defence, 2013, 2-1 – 2-2): 
 Test and challenge assumptions and identify potentially faulty logic 
 Assess the strength or the quality of information 
 Identify alternative options or outcomes and/or explore the consequences of 
the actions 
 Test a system, plan or perspective through the eyes of an adversary, outsider 
or competitor 
 Understand the options available to adversaries 
The nature of cyber events is fundamentally adversarial and therefore the interplay 
between Red team and Blue teams is important to understand. Branlat et al. (Branlat 
et al., 2011) explains the interplay from the Red team’s perspective which is shown in 
Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Red Team process (Branlat et al. 2011, 5) 
The figure indicates the same functional tasks that the Red Team should perform 
during cyber security exercises as described earlier by UK Ministry of Defense and 
Brangetto et al. (2015). 
Branlat et al. (2011) dictates for Red Team’s goals to defame, perform reconnais-
sance, invade, and eventually break or destroy targets. This sort of approach deter-
mines different requirements for tools and possibilities for Red Team to perform var-
ious techniques and objectives in a technical manner as well.  
Patriciu & Furtuna (2009) have defined offense oriented approach for cyber security 
exercises which can be perceived as Red teaming. They have stated that in order to 
perform real life cyber attack, the following steps should be performed: 
 Reconnaissaince 
 Scanning and enumeration 
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 Gain access or perform Denial of Service attack 
 Escalation of privileges 
 Maintain access 
 Cover tracks and place backdoors 
King (2014, 12) has listed samples of threats that can be executed in an exercise: 
 Natural disaster 
 Ignorant user 
 Malicious internal user 
 Network virus 
 Network denial of service (DoS) 
 Unauthorized computer on network 
 Malicious internal scanning 
 Computer compromise 
 Frequency phishing via email 
King (2014, 12) states that the list is not a comprehensive list of threats but is strives 
to give an idea what kind of threats can be executed in exercises. 
The requirements of Red teaming are covered in the following paragraphs divided 
into attack categories. 
4.5.2 Network attacks 
Internal network attacks are a tool for adversaries to intercept users’ traffic. In a local 
area network (LAN) segment one of the most common attack type is ARP (Address 
Resolution Protocol) spoofing. The ARP spoofing attack usually tries to cheat end 
user workstations to think that attacker’s machine is the gateway for the LAN seg-
ment or imposing as an internal host. The attack is performed forging the IP address 
and the corresponding MAC address, and sending forget ARP packets to the network. 
The detection of ARP spoofing attack can be performed using real-time traffic analy-
sis of the networks. (Hou, Jiang & Tian 2010) 
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The basic princible of ARP spoofing attack is illustrated in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. ARP spoofing attack 
The demands for the traffic capture are defined in requirement 1.6. 
The threats are not just directly targeted to organization’s systems and networks. 
The data transferring between organization’s physical locations (sites) and to public 
services can provide knowledge if accessed by adversaries. The attackers seek ways 
to intercept this kind of information remotely (mainly because of the cost-effective-
ness) by hijacking network traffic globally to transfer through attacker’s controlled 
systems. This kind of activity allows attackers either to disrupt, alter, or listen data 
transfers. This sort of attack vector is called Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Man in 
the Middle (MitM) attack. BGP MitM utilizes the global Internet Service Provider (ISP) 
architectrure which consists of many different Autonomous System domains that 
control a certain set of public IPv4 and/or IPv6 address blocks. The attacker tries to 
re-route the target’s public IP blocks on a different path and intercept the traffic with 
modified BGP updates of the target’s IP address block. (Pilosov & Kapela 2008, 8-31) 
BGP MitM attack vector has been used in the real life in many occasions (Cowie 
2013; Madory 2015; Toonk 2015). Some of the incidents are not hostile but just mis-
takes that might happen when rerouting traffic for example to DDoS Cloud mitigation 
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service (Toonk 2015). As the threat of BGP MitM is real, it is important that the tech-
nical environment of cyber security exercises provides this kind of opportunity in ex-
ercise scenarios. The requirement is defined in requirement 2.1.  
4.5.3 Distributed Denial of Service attacks 
Akamai (Akamai 2015) has posted in their “State of the internet” knowledge center 
information on different kinds of Distributed Denial of Service attacks. The attacks 
imposing certain demands to technical environment are covered in this chapter. 
Reflection DDoS attacks are attacks that sends floods of requests to third party-party 
servers which are not the target of the DDoS attack. The reflection attack uses the in-
tended target’s IP address as a spoofed source IP address to which the third-party 
servers (e.g. DNS servers) will direct the responses to the spoofed address which is 
the attacker’s intended target. This kind of attack utilizes the characteristics of con-
nectionless protocol UDP. 
Requirement 4.1: Spoofing the source IP address should be possible at least on cer-
tain parts of the technical environment 
NTP (Network Time Protocol) DDoS attacks are an example of reflection DDoS attacks 
which utilize globally available NTP servers to redirect the attack traffic. This defines 
the need to have globally available and possibly misconfigured NTP servers to enable 
this kind of attack vector. The requirement for NTP servers is defined in requirement 
2.2. 
DNS amplification and reflection attacks uses openly available resolving DNS servers 
to redirect and amplify the spoofed DNS query traffic. The amplification is performed 
using the fact that the query is often much smaller than the response. In many occa-
sions attackers will use crafted DNS records so the responses would be even bigger 
than the normal responses for often used queries. (Zargar, Joshi & Tipper 2013, 3-4) 
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The crafted DNS record enables attacker to amplify the attack traffic up to 54 times 
the amount of query traffic (US Cert 2015). The elements of DNS DDoS traffic deter-
mine the need for DNS infrastructure to the technical environment which is defined 
in requirement 2.2. 
The use of amplification attacks generates volumetric DDoS attacks, which means 
that the attacking traffic tries to overwhelm the target with excessive data flows. 
These sorts of attacks use as much bandwidth as possible. This kind of attack defines 
the requirement for the environment to handle excessive traffic flow to some extent.  
Requirement 4.2: Technical environment’s bandwidths should be scaled-down to 
create realistic setting for volumetric DDoS attack scenarios 
Building the cyber security exercise to handle any level of volumetric attacks would 
be costly; however using scaled bandwidths in ISP networks and access networks, it 
is possible to create realistic volumetric DDoS attack scenarios. 
4.5.4 Botnets and malware as an attack tools 
A botnet is a group of infected computers, mobiles, and servers that are connected 
together through the Internet. A botnet has three main elements – the bots (i.e. 
computers, mobiles, and servers), command and control (C&C) servers, and the bot-
masters. The infected bot machine connects and makes end devices a part of a bot-
net without the machine owners’ knowledge. The control of the bots and the botnet 
is under control of a malicious person, known as the botmaster who controls all the 
infected bots and sends orders to the entire botnet through the C&C servers. The 
aim of the botmaster is to carry out the malicious activities. (Eslahi, Salleh & Anuar 
2012) 
Eslahi et al. (2012) state that botnets go through the same stages in their lifecycle. 
Figure 6 shows the general view of a botnet lifecycle stated by Eslahi et al. (2012).  
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Figure 6. Botnets' lifecycle (Eslahi et al. 2012) 
Gu, Zhang and Lee (Gu, Zhang & Lee 2008) state in their study on “BotSniffer: Detect-
ing Botnet Command and Control Channels in Network Traffic” that a centralized 
C&C architecture can be categorized into “push” or “pull” style depending on how 
the botmaster’s commands reach the bots. Figure 7 illustrates the differences of the 
two styles. 
Bots C&C Server Bot Master
Pull Style
Push Style
 
Figure 7. Botnet command and control styles 
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The botnet’s use of style depends on the connectivity method. For example, in bot-
nets that use Internet Relay Chat (IRC) protocol to connect bots to C&C server, the 
server initiates the conversations between the server and the bot (i.e. push style). 
However, when using HTTP, HTTPS, or DNS as the connectivity method, the bots initi-
ate the conversation with the C&C server (i.e. Pull style).  
The botnets are a common tool for cyber attackers when they scan networks, spread 
malware or conduct attacks against enterprises and organizations. Therefore it is 
necessary to have botnet functionalities in the technical environment of cyber secu-
rity exercises. The environment should have a ready-made architecture of botnets 
that can gather information on targets, conduct attacks, and spread malware which 
generates requirement 4.3. The botnets also use of different command and control 
channel, which determines also requirement 4.4.  
Requirement 4.3: Ready-made architecture of botnets that can gather information 
on targets, conduct attacks, and spread malware. 
Malware is a term used to refer to a variety of forms of malicious, hostile or intrusive 
software (Moir 2003). Targeted attacks often use custom made malware to exploit 
known and unknown vulnerabilities of software. The initial exploitation is made by 
providing malicious content to the targeted organization using email phishing, USB, 
or other delivery mechanisms. The targeted attacks often uses unknown vulnerabili-
ties of software as Kaspersky states in their Duqu 2.0 technical analysis report and F-
secure states in The Dukes - 7 years of Russian cyberespionage report. The malware 
used in targeted attacks use various command and control channels (F-secure, 2015). 
Many of the C&C channels use a specific protocol to communicate with C&C server; 
however, also public services such as Twitter can also be used as communication 
channel (F-secure, 2015). These sorts of highly developed malware create a need to 
support various C&C channel protocols and services in the technical environment 
which is covered in requirement 4.4. 
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Requirement 4.4: Technical environment should provide possibility to use various 
command and control channels for controlling the botnets and/or malware 
Botnets and malware that just use a certain protocol (e.g. HTTP, FTP) to deliver com-
mands and data to C&C server do not create special requirements for technical envi-
ronment; however, malware that use external services (e.g. social media, cloud stor-
age) to deliver data does. This kind of activity creates the need for requirement 2.5, 
2.7, and 2.8. 
The external services also include DNS architecture which is used in many malicious 
software to deliver data using DNS queries and responses. These kind of malware use 
domain generation algorithms and rapidly changing domain names for C&C server 
communication as stated by Schiavoni et al. 2014 in their study on “Phoenix: DGA-
based botnet tracking and intelligence” and stated by Antonakakis et al 2012 in their 
study on “From Throw-Away Traffic to Bots: Detecting the Rise of DGA-Based Mal-
ware”. This sort of functionality creates the need for requirement 2.2. 
4.5.5 Social engineering attacks 
Social engineering is a set of techniques used to deceive victims to expose confiden-
tial information or performing actions. These sort of attacks are non-technical intru-
sions that utilize human interactions and aim to bypass technological security mecha-
nisms. The social engineering attackers can use various technical and non-technical 
means to conduct social engineering, such as, phishing, online social engineering, 
shoulder surfing, and pretexting. (Luo, Brody, Seazzu & Burd 2011, 1-4) 
Considering cyber security exercises, pretexting, phishing, and online social engineer-
ing are the most likely scenarios to use in exercises. Phishing in particular is often 
used as a part of Red Team campaign to gain information by sending a masqueraded 
e-mail that looks like it has orginated from a legitimate source (e.g. bank or credit 
card company requesting verification, or internal organizations). Pretexting can be 
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used to impersonate co-workers, authorities or 3rd party contractors whose infor-
mation might be completely fake; however, it has realistic services for so called call-
back checks. 
Social engineering attacks can be very difficult to execute successfully in fictional sce-
nario which determines the needs for realism when conducting social engineering 
techniques. The realism can be realistic e-mails, pretext company web sites, and op-
erational social media services. These requirements are covered in requirements 2.4, 
2.7 and 3.5. 
4.5.6 Watering hole and drive-by attacks 
Watering hole attacks use exploited web servers to spread malware to a web site’s 
users. The exploiting of the web servers is usually done through one of the following 
two methods: 
 Web site’s server or web application has a vulnerability that the attacker can 
exploit directly from the Internet 
 Attackers gain access via victim’s internal networks to get access and control 
of the web server. Once they have the control, the attackers can configure 
the site to spread malware to web site’s users 
The exploitation of the unsuspecting users often utilizes users’ outdated software 
(e.g. web browser or operating system). Watering hole is often associated with the 
term malvertising which means that the web server spreading the malware itself has 
not been compromised but the malware is delivered through advertising feeds that 
are displayed on the web page alongside the victim’s content. (Donaldson, Siegel, 
Williams & Aslam 2015, 282) 
The malvertising attack vector, in particular, determines needs to have public web 
sites accessible by anyone using the exercise’s Internet (see requirement 2.7 and 
2.8). The news media and social media sites usually uses advertisements on their 
pages, which creates the requirement 4.5. 
43 
 
 
Requirement 4.5: Technical environment’s Internet should have an advertising net-
work which can be used to provide advertisements to different web sites 
4.6 Exercise control requirements (White team) 
4.6.1 Scenario and events handling 
Requirement 5.1: The exercises should have web based service for handling the ex-
ercise’s scenario and the events 
Cyber security exercises are conducted with the help of exercise event lists and work-
flows. The different events will be played out as injects which can be provided to par-
ticipant teams either as play cards or via technical systems (e.g. emails, VoIP calls). 
The exercise’s control personnel should have centralized web services for controlling 
the exercise and delivering the different injects for participants. 
Koufil et al. 2014 have defined in their study of Cloud-based testbed for simulation of 
cyber attacks that the environment should include scenario management and config-
uration systems for controlling the events. The scenario management node in their 
study is defined to control the environment; however, it is also necessary to provide 
systems for handling and controlling the actual flow of events and information to 
participants. 
4.6.2 Reporting to exercise management 
The exercise’s control should be aware of the events detected and actions done in 
participating teams. The use of specified and formalized reporting about team’s ac-
tions should be implemented as a part of the technical environment. The reporting is 
also important for evaluating the actions after the exercise. 
Requirement 5.2: Participants should be able to report their actions to exercise’s 
control personnel 
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4.6.3 Situational awareness of the exercise 
Controlling cyber security exercises is essential to ensure that the exercise is con-
ducted according to the scenario and the objectives are met.  
Requirement 5.3: The exercise’s control should have situational awareness of the 
exercise provided from technical environment 
During the exercises a defending team member (blue teams) should be able to main-
tain situational awareness of their infrastructure and services. The technical environ-
ment should enable the possibility to test simultaneously various systems for provid-
ing situational awareness. 
Requirement 5.4: The technical environment should enable opportunity to exercise 
situational awareness during the cyber incidents 
4.7 User and Traffic simulation  
4.7.1 Overview of user and traffic simulations 
Branlat et al. (2011) states the needs for traffic simulations as a part of the exercises. 
The participants of the blue teams have to make sure they can separate legitimate 
and illegitimate traffic. When IT administrations of the servers, security, and net-
works systems are faced with high amounts of activity, they need to distinguish valid 
traffic from attack traffic. The traffic simulation needs to have distinguishable charac-
teristics of network traffic (type, source, destination, content, volume).  
Chen, Zhang and Urvoy-Keller (Chen, Zhang & Urvoy-Keller, 2014) have made an 
analysis of the modern mid-sized enterprise’s traffic profiles. They have focused on 
profiling different characteristics of 24-hour data capture and have measured vol-
umes, ratios of internal and external traffic, and the amount of local hosts in the cap-
tured flows. This sort of study gives a good idea how the traffic simulation variables 
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needs to be considered to provide realistic traffic profiles and contents for cyber se-
curity exercises.  
The definition of different traffic profiles however is out of the scope of this thesis, 
whereas the requirements considering the need and generalized contents for traffic 
simulation for the exercise environment are discussed in this section. 
4.7.2 Simulation of Internet users 
The global world (“Internet”) should have a great number of simulated end users 
who can generate different traffic profiles and patterns. The automated traffic 
should be made as realistic as possible. At least the following traffic profiles/proto-
cols should be generated: 
- Web browsing 
- Email conversations 
- Instant messaging 
- Social media simulation 
The simulation of Internet based users is used to generate valid end user traffic to-
wards the exercise’s Blue Teams and their services if the Blue Team is providing pub-
lic services in the exercise’s scenario. The automated system should support varia-
tion of traffic generation meaning that the sources appear as unique users and their 
activity should be able to randomize or made constant. 
Requirement 6.1: Internet based end users should be simulated with an automated 
system 
4.7.3 Simulation of organization’s internal users  
The organization’s internal users (inside the Blue Team environments) should be sim-
ulated with an automatic system. The user simulation should generate various traffic 
profiles that are common in enterprises. 
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Requirement 6.2: Blue Team based end users should be simulated with an auto-
mated system 
Internal users that are located in a Blue Team environment should be automated for 
simulating general activities of normal users within the organization. At least the fol-
lowing activities/traffic profiles/protocols should be generated: 
 User logins to internal systems 
 Web browsing to internal and external networks 
 Usage of non web-based services within the organization 
 Access to file storages and other infrastructure services (e.g. DNS servers and 
NTP servers) 
 Incidents for the organization’s IT administration 
The automated system should support variation of traffic generation meaning that 
the sources appear as unique users and their activity should be able to be random-
ized or made constant. 
4.7.4 Background noise traffic 
Various kind of non-user traffic (also called white noise) occurs on the Internet gen-
erated by scanners, web crawlers, abusive systems etc. The technical environment 
should have an automated system to generate these kinds of traffic patterns to cre-
ate a realistic “smoke screen” for normal end user and cyber attacks. 
This kind of background noise traffic should include: 
- Port scanning to UDP and TCP ports 
- Low level DDoS attacks 
- Traffic with broken protocol implementation (i.e. traffic not matching stand-
ards, invalid header options in TCP headers for example) 
- Brute force logins to different authentication systems (i.e. SSH and HTTP) 
- DNS queries   
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The automated system should support variation of traffic generation meaning that 
the sources appear as unique and their activity should be able to be randomized or 
made constant. 
Requirement 6.3: Background noise traffic should be generated with an automated 
system 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
Cyber security exercise is a tool for organizations to test their critical capabilities and 
find out how they integrate personnel, processes, and technology to protect their 
critical information, services, and assets against modern cyber threats. Regular exer-
cises can be integrated in the organization’s cyber security strategy, which also ena-
bles an organization to experiment and further develop their capabilities on handling 
cyber security incidents and events.  
Cyber security exercises can have many forms and scopes which creates many de-
mands for the technical environment. The exercises can have multiple organizations 
at the same and their interdependencies often act as a critical part of an exercise’s 
scenario which needs to be implemented in a technical manner as well. Conducting 
these kinds of exercises is a challenge for the technical environment which is used as 
a platform for exercises. The technical environment should be flexible, feature rich, 
and have real life counterparts of many technologies in order to conduct realistic 
cyber threats and defence methods. The digitalization and new technologies require 
agile and rapid changes to the technical environment which can be encompassed 
with modular structure and use of virtualization even though many technologies also 
still need physical elements and devices to operate, which is critical to take into ac-
count when the planning and constructing the technical environment for cyber secu-
rity exercises start. 
The goal for the thesis was to find generalized requirements for different elements of 
the technical environment. The used research method was inductive and qualitative 
and the used references were mainly scientific publications of cyber security exer-
cises or cyber threat testbeds; however, handbooks and best practice guides were 
also used. The major challenge was to find distinctive requirements for the technical 
environment mainly because many of the publications focus on conducting, control-
ling, and managing the cyber security exercises. They often ignore the important role 
of the technical environment as a part of conducting different kinds of exercises.  
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This kind of research method helped to find and define the most common require-
ments for the technical environment; however, it was crucial to use knowledge of 
normal IT environments, procedures, and cyber attacks to create additional require-
ments. The restriction of inductive research method in this matter was the lack of 
publications of requirements. Many of the requirements needed to be derived from 
real life counterparts either by using other references and the author’s own 
knowledge and experience on conducting cyber security exercises and developing 
technical environment. 
The requirements consist of 35 separate claims that should be considered when im-
plementing a versatile and multi-purpose exercise environment. The list of the re-
quirements is a general reference for constructing and developing technical environ-
ment for cyber security exercises. The requirements are kept on a generalized level 
mainly because the goal was not to define only one purpose requirement specifica-
tion but to work as a guideline. Also, available resources, physical infrastructure, li-
censes, and personnel are crucial factors when deciding on what level the environ-
ment is possible to be constructed and maintained. Depending on these factors, it is 
possible to implement a technical environment on many levels.  
The overall view of the research can be considered as a first level of requirements for 
a technical environment. In the future, as technologies develop and digitalization be-
comes a more integrated part of life, the technical environment for cyber security ex-
ercises needs to evolve to encompass new requirements and needs to exercise or-
ganizations and personnel in the cyber domain. The gathered requirements do not 
cover all the aspects of cyber domain because of the lack of research of the area. The 
further research should consider looking into challenges that the organizations are 
facing nowadays or in the future. Upcoming researches on creating requirements for 
technical environment of cyber security exercises should focus on integrating mobile, 
Internet of Things (IOT), Industrial control systems (ICS), and physical elements as a 
part of the environment and exercise scenarios. 
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APPENDIX I: COMPLETE LIST OF REQUIREMENTS 
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS: 
Requirement 1.1:  Technical environment should be isolated and controlled 
Requirement 1.2:  Remote usage of the environment should be available  
Requirement 1.3:  
Airlock implementation for using certain real life services from 
Internet 
Requirement 1.4:  
Airlock implementation for transferring files to isolated exer-cise 
environment 
Requirement 1.5:  
Use of virtualization and container virtualization to improve effi-
ciency 
Requirement 1.6:  
Network traffic capture should be possible from different parts 
of the technical environment 
Requirement 1.7:  The technical environment should have a modular structure 
  
GLOBAL WORLD OR THE "INTERNET": 
Requirement 2.1:  Global ISP infrastructure for providing backbone of “Internet”. 
Requirement 2.2:  Global DNS and NTP infrastructure 
Requirement 2.3:  Global certificate and/or PKI infrastructure 
Requirement 2.4:  Comprehensive set of public web services 
Requirement 2.5:  Cloud services as part of global “Internet” 
Requirement 2.6:  Operating systems’ and application update repositories 
Requirement 2.7:  
Social media sites and functionalities should be implemented as 
part of the technical environment 
Requirement 2.8:  
A set of news media sites should be implemented as part of the 
technical environment 
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DEFENDING TEAM REQUIREMENTS: 
Requirement 3.1:  
Participants should be able to build their own systems and ser-
vices 
Requirement 3.2:  
Providing ready-made blue team systems and services as tem-
plates 
Requirement 3.3:  Internal infrastructure services 
Requirement 3.4:  Public services provided by Blue Team 
Requirement 3.5:  Internal and external communication services 
Requirement 3.6:  
Technical management tools for preventing, detecting, handling, 
and recovering from cyber incidents 
Requirement 3.7:  
Participants should be able to implement and integrate their 
own tools as part of the exercise environment 
Requirement 3.8:  
Services that simulate or mimic real life critical services for en-
terprises 
  
THREAT ACTORS’ REQUIREMENTS: 
Requirement 4.1:  
Spoofing the source IP address should be possible at least on 
certain parts of the technical environment 
Requirement 4.2:  
Technical environment’s bandwidths should be scaled-down to 
create realistic setting for volumetric DDoS attack scenarios 
Requirement 4.3:  
Ready-made architecture of botnets that can gather information 
on targets, conduct attacks, and spread malware. 
Requirement 4.4:  
Technical environment should provide possibility to use various 
command and control channels for controlling the botnets 
and/or malware 
Requirement 4.5:  
Technical environment’s Internet should have an advertising net-
work which can be used to provide ads to different web sites 
  
EXERCISE CONTROL REQUIREMENTS: 
Requirement 5.1:  
The exercises should have web based service for handling the ex-
ercise’s scenario and the events 
Requirement 5.2:  
Participants should be able to report their actions to exercise’s 
control personnel 
Requirement 5.3:  
The exercise’s control should have situational awareness of the 
exercise provided from technical environment 
Requirement 5.4:  
The technical environment should enable opportunity to exer-
cise situational awareness during the cyber incidents 
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USER/TRAFFIC SIMULATION REQUIREMENTS: 
Requirement 6.1: 
Internet based end users should be simulated with an auto-
mated system 
Requirement 6.2:  
Blue team based end users should be simulated with an auto-
mated system 
Requirement 6.3:  
Background noise traffic should be generated with an automated 
system 
 
 
